Things like this don’t fix themselves

Friday’s Fiasco: when the incidents aren’t isolated

A UPS cargo plane crashed in Kentucky last November after an engine separated mid-takeoff according to BBC News. Fifteen people died. Last week, investigators revealed Boeing knew about cracks in that exact part, and had known since 2011. Their response? A non-binding "service letter" suggesting visual checks every five years and offering (but not requiring) a replacement part.

This wasn't an isolated incident. Boeing had documented the same issue on four separate occasions across three different aircraft. They looked at the evidence and concluded it "would not result in a safety of flight condition." The NTSB's language, "fractures due to fatigue", tells a different story. The piece in question is a load-bearing component. It holds engines to wings. When it fails, planes fall out of the sky.

Boeing's name keeps appearing in accident reports for the same reasons: known risks, inadequate responses, systems that prioritise process over protection. The 737 Max disasters. The door panel falling off mid-flight. Now this. Each time, the common thread is a company that saw warning signs and chose reassurance over remedy.

Boeing has given a statement offering condolences and noting they're "supporting the investigation." What’s missing? An acknowledgement that their 2011 assessment might have been catastrophically wrong and an explanation for why operators weren't required to replace a failing part. The gap between "what we knew" and "what we did" speaks for itself.

If Boeing asked us what to do next, we'd say:

Acknowledgement requires stating clearly: "we identified a critical flaw in 2011 and our response was insufficient. Non-binding guidance for a safety-critical component was inadequate."

Apology means you cannot avoid the existence of the fifteen families whose loved ones are gone and the investigators who had to document preventable deaths, but you can apologise to them.

Accountability means explaining why Boeing concluded that failures in a load-bearing engine attachment "would not result in a safety of flight condition" - and what systemic failures in risk assessment allowed that conclusion to stand unchallenged.

Amends means mandatory inspections, mandatory replacements, and fundamental changes to how safety concerns are assessed and acted upon. It means retiring "service letters" as a response mechanism for safety-critical failures.

Which leaves us with two lingering questions: (1) how many other service letters are sitting in Boeing's files right now, treating safety-critical failures as maintenance suggestions? And (2) what will it take before "we identified the problem" becomes "we fixed it before anyone else died"?

This is what happens when accountability becomes something you document rather than something you do.

Fear not - if you’re missing Leah’s Fixer agony aunt column, all weekly editions can be found on Leah’s LinkedIn on Fridays. We’re switching to video so it will be on YouTube, IG, and TikTok from February 2026.

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The WayFinders Group specialises in organisational repair, diagnosing damage and delivering 90-day interventions that restore trust and performance. If your organisation needs repair rather than reassurance, email [email protected] for a confidential consultation.

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